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Editors’ Note to Chapter 2 
One of the most persistent tropes in the field of language and law is the densely 
loaded expression that law is a ‘profession of words’. The influence of that phrase 
stems from Mellinkoff’s use of it as an epigraph in The Language of the Law (1963); and 
its intricacies have been systematically explicated in Constable (1998). ‘Words’, when 
used in legal contexts, can mean anything from lexical items independent of context 
(lemmas) through to particular tokens of a word used in a given context; ‘words’ is 
also used, also vaguely, to mean part of or a whole utterance or text. Ainsworth, this 
volume, also draws attention to how the ‘profession of words’ phrase may bear some 
responsibility for more attention being given in current research to legal vocabulary 
than to other linguistic structures such as syntactic organisation. Durant’s chapter is a 
study of the established ‘vocabulary’ kind; but it goes beyond description of the legal 
lexicon into analysis of the potential impact of semantic variation in people’s use of 
general legal terms on public understanding of and attitudes towards law.  
Durant argues that words including law itself, justice, authority, rights, rule, regulation, 
legitimacy and others form a loose but distinctive sub-field within the English lexicon: a 
field made up of general words naming or describing law which together 
conceptualise what law is and how it fits into the wider field of social relations. Such 
words may on some occasions of use, he argues, be treated as legal terms of art. But 
even in their legal settings – especially across different jurisdictions – they show 
considerable indeterminacy of meaning, especially polysemy, vagueness and 
contestability. Durant’s chapter explores which words it is useful to think of as being 
in such a cluster of core, general terms of law. He then describes what is meant in this 
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context by polysemy, vagueness, and contestability and, through an extended reading 
of the history, semantic development and current use in different meanings of the 
word law, shows how such considerations can affect what we understand as ‘law’ in 
legally and politically relevant ways. 
In a recent volume celebrating the work of the late Peter Tiersma (along with 
Mellinkoff, perhaps the other most influential figure in modern linguistic work on 
legal language), the US jurist Frederick Schauer assessed what has been accomplished 
in the study of legal vocabulary and what remains to be done. He concluded, ‘The 
work that remains to be done, however, is that of analysing the relationship between 
the conventions of the technical and the conventions of the ordinary, and to do so in 
a way that recognises law’s parallel needs to speak to itself and at the same time to 
speak to those outside it.’ (Schauer, 2015:38). Durant’s chapter responds to the 
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Seeing Sense: The Complexity of Key Words That Tell Us What Law Is   
Alan Durant 
 
The nature of law, the rule of law, legal order, law and order, rightful, basic human rights, rights 
and responsibilities, against natural justice, social justice, the interests of justice, just and equitable  
 
There is an interesting group of English words and expressions – illustrated above 
by sample phrases clustered around law, right(s), and justice - which are generally 
recognised as communicating important attributes of what we call ‘law’. Those 
attributes (including authority, legitimacy, justness, etc.) are relevant whether we 
are thinking of law as an abstract entity (cf. natural law or positive law), as a body of 
doctrines or institutional system (cf. the law, legal order), or as a singular realisation (a 
law, legislative act). For centuries arguments about such attributes have complicated 
debates about what distinguishes ‘law’ from coercion and other forms of exertion 
of power, from custom and belief or retribution and revenge, and from moral 
judgement. So the existence of a cluster of ‘key’ expressions1 which lexicalise those 
attributes can seem an elephant in the room in efforts to understand ‘the language 
of law’.  
What I will call in shorthand ‘law-designating’ words including law, right(s) and 
justice, as above (plus equitable, authority, sovereignty, legitimate, rule, order and regulation, 
and some others introduced below) are used in various ways in different contexts. 
Some are used in legal rules. Some combine with other words to form stable 
phrases, and among those phrases some lend their name to a legal principle, 
doctrine or ideal (e.g. legitimate expectation, the rule of law). Most can also be found in 
political, diplomatic, journalistic and scholarly comment on the place and 
significance of law in society. The same clustering of expressions surfaces in 
conversation among people subject to law but not professionally involved in 
making, applying or studying it. In the last-mentioned of these domains, general 
                                         
1 The phrase ‘key expressions’ here alludes to established use of the term ‘keywords’. Analysis of such keywords in 
English is usually associated with the work of Raymond Williams (1976/1983), who started to research such words 
by collecting usage of a cluster of five words (industry, democracy, class, art, and culture) that suggested themselves as 
‘key points’ from which he could draw ‘a map’ of ‘changes in life and thought’ he was seeking to explain in Culture 
and Society 1780-1950 (1958:13). Williams planned to publish entries for these and other such words as an Appendix 
to that book but later published instead a separate book: a ‘vocabulary of culture and society’ consisting of over 100 
words (for context and discussion, see Durant 2006). My involvement in research based on Williams's approach in 
the ‘Keywords Project’ (keywordsproject.pitt.edu) has shaped this chapter; though the specialised, normative 




public usage or ‘ordinary language’, such words and phrases offer vernacular 
versions – frequently dismissed as bowdlerised versions – of what law is and what 
values it stands for.  
In ‘non-legal’ settings among the situations just described, expressions which form 
the general terminology of law are commonly used with meanings or nuances that 
differ, sometimes markedly, from their conception in law. An order may be a meal, 
authority a generalized enemy, and law something Kafkaesque; sovereignty can become 
a vague political football; and the rule of law may be an established status or a 
continuously tested process or aspiration, or even taken to be something 
resembling law and order. Are such uses nothing more than misuse of technical 
terms and ignorance – hence ‘bowdlerisation’? Lawyers mostly say so, emphasising 
the separation of law from other kinds of discourse as a specialist field with its own 
terminology, mode of reasoning, and rules. Many non-lawyers, on the other hand – 
and among them some philosophers – foreground how vague or ambiguous many 
of the core terms in and about law are. Is it possible that these two opposing views 
are not completely at odds with one another, and that the property of semantic 
indeterminacy – an incompleteness or failure of words to signify a particular 
meaning - is functional in some way analogous to how vagueness has been shown 
to play particular roles in legal drafting and statutory interpretation (Endicott, 2000; 
Waldron, 1994)? This essay considers the possibility. 
The idea that a social purpose might be served by complexity, rather than 
precision, in words whose task it is to tell us what law is seems odd. But if true the 
idea could be significant as regards the ‘language of law’, because the words and 
phrases in question are not generally considered to be uncertain but rather viewed 
as having settled meanings, even when there is profound disagreement as regards 
what those meanings are. As is often pointed out, law has its etymological origins in 
something being ‘fixed’ or ‘laid down’; adjectival right develops from ‘movement in 
a straight line, direct, unswerving’; and lex and legal are traceable controversially 
either to ‘something tied or bound’, from Latin ligare, or ‘something written down 
to be read’, from Latin legere (Cassin, 2014). In the absence of a prescriptive 
language Academy, however, by what authority could meanings for such words be 
prescribed for situations where they are not employed as specialised legal terms but 
rather, as most of the words to be discussed have been for centuries, used as active 
political and general expressions?  
The relation between legal and other meanings associated with the same words in 
different contexts merits investigation, despite the significant difficulty that the 
questions which surface are interdisciplinary. The issues are linguistically interesting 
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because of the questions about semantic variation and norms they raise; they are 
also legally interesting, in appearing to engage the principle of legal certainty. The 
‘public understanding’ aspect of that principle requires words used in law to be 
definite and clear in telling us what the law is, so that citizens can organise their 
affairs in a way that does not break the law. Sensibly, but leaving important 
problems unresolved, the principle only expects such words to tell us what the law 
is, not what law is.  
Proper analysis of semantic variation in the meaning of general legal words calls for 
investigation of each word, as well as of the semantic relationships between them. 
Below there is scarcely space even to mention them all. But there are general points 
worth making even if those points can only be illustrated by brief examples. 
Subject to these limitations, this chapter probes how the distinction used in 
dictionaries between ‘general’ and ‘specialised’ usage relates to law in a highly 
distinctive way. It examines aspects of semantic indeterminacy in some core legal 
expressions that follow from their polysemy, vagueness or contestability, and asks 
whether, on account of these characteristics, such expressions may in some way 
function as a conduit for, rather than as a blockage to, legal-lay communication. If 
so, the chapter concludes, questions arise regarding how (and how far) public 
participation in law is made possible by what is communicated, given the 
fundamental asymmetries of power and understanding of law involved. 
Context: Language of Law, Theories of Law 
It is counterintuitive that the most general words which name and describe law 
might not have been exhaustively discussed already. A substantial body of 
scholarship exists on legal concepts and their associated terminology, as well as on 
representation of legal words in specialist dictionaries (Mac Aodha, 2014). 
Introductions to legal pedagogy, in English, often acknowledge the many meanings 
of law (though less often differences of meaning between law and cognate words in 
other languages). In this section I argue that, despite these considerations, not 
enough attention has been given to the meaning of general legal words. To develop 
this point, I comment first on two fields which might be expected to examine such 
meanings but seem not to in any detail: linguistic studies of legal vocabulary; and 
discussion in Anglo-American philosophy of law on how word meaning 
contributes to legal concepts. 
Linguistic Approaches to Legal Vocabulary  
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Work in linguistics is mostly descriptive, including studies concerned with 
vocabulary (lexis). Where analysis is not descriptive, linguistic studies are still only 
rarely prescriptive (prescriptive approaches typically fall outside the scope of 
linguistics as a discipline). Rather, linguistic studies that go beyond description 
generally aim to be explanatory (e.g. by accounting for aspects of language 
acquisition or, at a higher level, the human capacity that makes language acquisition 
possible). From the outset, therefore, there is typically a divergence of purpose 
between linguistic and legal approaches to what words mean. 
The central descriptive task of linguistics consists in examining structures and 
patterns in language use as they actually occur rather than as they should be. Such 
features, including word meaning, can be described ‘synchronically’ (as contrasts 
within a given language system at a particular point in time) or ‘diachronically’ 
(concerned with historical change). Either approach can have a comparative 
dimension, examining contrasts between different languages or contact between 
them such as borrowing of loanwords. 
Linguistic studies of ‘the language of the law’ often combine historical and 
synchronic perspectives, and tend to emphasise the distinctiveness, even 
peculiarity, of legal language as a variety (Mellinkoff 1963, Crystal and Davy, 1969, 
Tiersma, 1999). Peculiarities noted include complexity of sentence grammar in 
operative legal documents, minimal use historically of punctuation or structure 
mapping by means of paragraphs and sections, a preponderance of vocabulary of 
Romance origin, persistent archaism, and use of ‘binomial pairs’ (i.e. doubling of 
near-synonyms such as aid and abet, cease and desist, last will and testament, often 
collocating words with origins in different languages; sometimes also triples, such 
as null, void and to no effect). More recently, legal language has been shown to be a 
suitable topic for corpus linguistic investigation (Coulthard and Johnson, 2007). 
Comparative studies are less common. But Mattila (2013) describes legal use of 
language in a number of European languages and assesses the legacy of Latin in 
legal systems developed in those languages. Cassin (2014) traces linguistic and 
conceptual interaction between languages and considers English expressions such 
as authority, justice, law, liberty, power, and the rule of law - along with their counterparts 
in other European languages – to be ‘untranslatables’: the words do have cognates, 
but those cognates are embedded in different formations of ideas as well as 
different institutions and legal systems. Also concerned with cross-linguistic 
comparison, Wierzbicka (1997, 2006) has mapped semantic overlap and 
differences for various cultural fields onto roughly 60 postulated semantic 
primitives of a ‘natural semantic metalanguage’, or NSM (her analysis of reasonable 
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being the most relevant legal discussion; Wierzbicka 2006). As has been suggested 
above, however, comparative analysis is important within jurisdictions as well as 
between them, especially historically. Any account of legal English vocabulary, for 
example, must assess the changing role played in its development by different 
languages including Norse, Anglo-Saxon, Anglo-Norman, and Latin. 
Linguistic discussion that is concerned particularly with the meanings of words as 
used in law has directed its spotlight less on words naming or describing what law 
is than on challenges faced by judges in statutory construction: how meanings are 
attributed by courts in applying laws that use ordinary words to establish legal 
categories. Hutton (2014) analyses numerous cases. Solan (2010) and Carston 
(2011), in different ways, evaluate how judicial approaches to attributing meaning 
(for instance based on maxims, Scalia and Garner, 2012) relate to natural language 
processing as understood in linguistics and psychology. Durant (2010) explores 
how courts interpret words used in utterances other than those found in the 
wording of legal rules: words which become the crux of a legal dispute because of 
their contested occurrence in media discourse or communication online. 
The focus of the present topic, however, on general terms for law which can bear 
varying meanings across different domains of use, has received little attention. 
Central to the topic, as with statutory interpretation but with different emphasis, is 
the dichotomy with which this section began: between descriptive and normative 
purposes in both the use and analysis of language. ‘Normative’ purposes, in this 
context, must be clarified as operating at several levels. First, there is normative 
with respect to behavioural outcomes (since operative legal language confers rights, 
imposes obligations and guides action, and so performs a socially directive 
function; linguistically, commands, use of modals such as ought or should, and 
implied meanings all play a part). Second, there is ‘linguistically normative’ 
(concerned with which words should be used, for example to comply with 
courtroom etiquette, and how words should be construed in legal cases). Both 
these senses need then to be distinguished from so-called ‘normative legal theory’, 
which is interested in what law could or should be and stands in contrast to two 
established ‘analytical’ approaches: descriptive legal theory (e.g. doctrinal studies 
investigating regularities in a particular legal system) and explanatory legal theory 
(e.g. Marxist accounts of how law serves an ideological function in social 
structure). Although in legal discourse different levels of normativity typically 
reinforce each other, linguists bring a descriptive and explanatory mind-set even to 
normative language. It is of course possible to examine linguistic normativity 
descriptively (Bartsch, 1987); but understanding the normative constraints on 
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language use in law requires a level of familiarity with legal concepts and 
procedures that can discourage linguistic researchers, especially if they feel 
unsympathetic in principle to normative linguistic judgement. 
Words and Concepts in Jurisprudence 
The possibility that core words for law have not been exhaustively examined in 
jurisprudence seems still less likely. But there are grounds for thinking it may be 
the case in works that treat explication of verbal meaning as largely irrelevant to 
conceptual analysis at the level required of general theories of law. As Finnis puts it 
in his account of legal theories early in Natural Law and Natural Rights, 
Jurisprudence, like other social sciences, aspires to be more than a conjunction of 
lexicography with local history, or even than a juxtaposition of all lexicographies 
conjoined with all local histories. (Finnis 1980:4). 
Works of Anglo-American jurisprudence by theorists such as Dworkin or Raz, like 
Finnis, tend to construct their arguments through critique, use of hypothetical 
scenarios, and practical reasoning. In doing so, they show only passing interest in 
the meaning of words. Ultimately this is the case with Finnis, too, though his 
writing is often more attentive to verbal nuance - before dismissing it as irrelevant: 
I use the concept of justice with all the breadth that that concept has had in 
academic discussion since Aristotle first treated it as an academic topic. That is to 
say, I set aside all the special and limited shades of meaning that the word justice 
may have acquired in common parlance… We must let our discussion be ruled by 
the substantive questions we have in mind (about what is reasonable and 
unreasonable in human conflict), not by the conventions and associations of our 
language. (Finnis 1980:161-2).  
In accounts of law that go beyond particular laws or legal systems – into arguments 
for instance about natural law, the nature of law, the authority of law, or law as justice, as 
works by the authors mentioned do – specific legal systems are treated as 
instantiations of a supposed more general legal form. At that level of abstraction 
complexities in the meaning of words get left behind except where some specific 
ambiguity hinders the argument.  
Emphasis on concepts more than on how words convey them has not been an 
uninterrupted tradition in Anglo-American philosophy of law, however (let alone 
in the longer history of thinking about law, for instance among the Scholastics and 
Renaissance lawyers who were accustomed to grappling with philological 
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problems). The contemporary emphasis I have mentioned involves to some extent 
a reaction against an earlier ‘linguistic turn’, including a period of influence of 
ordinary language philosophy on the jurisprudence of H.L.A. Hart from the late 
1940s onwards. In The Concept of Law (1994 [1961]), Hart acknowledges the 
influence on his thinking of Oxford philosopher J.L.Austin (a second John Austin, 
not the 19th-century jurist and author of The Province of Jurisprudence Determined 
(1861)). Hart praises Austin’s insight that, as Hart glosses it in the Preface,  
Many important distinctions, which are not immediately obvious, between types of 
social situation or relationships may best be brought to light by an examination of 
the standard uses of the relevant expressions and of the way in which these depend 
on a social context, itself often left unstated.’ (Hart 1994 [1961]: vi).  
Hart and other legal philosophers of the time were especially impressed by Austin’s 
essay ‘A Plea for Excuses’ (1979 [1956]) and incorporated ideas into their thinking 
encapsulated in Hart’s tribute to Austin: that it is possible to use ‘a sharpened 
awareness of words to sharpen our perception of the phenomena’ (Hart 1994 
[1961]: vi). For a variety of reasons, nevertheless, The Concept of Law proved a high-
water mark of influence of this kind of language-focused analysis.  
The next generation of influential philosophers of law in the same tradition, 
especially Raz and Dworkin, thought differently. In Dworkin’s Law’s Empire (1986), 
references to ‘semantic’ characteristics are to something wider than verbal nuance. 
Dworkin uses ‘semantic’ to refer to what he calls ‘semantic theories’: theories 
which, as he describes them, are concerned with ‘how all lawyers use the word law’ 
(Dworkin, 1986:36). But ‘use the word law’ here is figurative (and note that 
Dworkin is only interested in how lawyers use the word, not how other language 
users do). He begins his analysis of law by contrasting ‘semantic’ with ‘plain fact’ 
accounts (i.e. accounts of particular laws which have been passed) and describes 
semantic theories as ones which call for ‘digging out shared rules from a careful 
study of what lawyers say and do’ (Dworkin 1986:43), especially elucidation of 
rules and criteria supporting a ‘common assumption, which is that we [lawyers again] 
do share some set of standards about how law is to be used.’ (Dworkin 1986:32) 
Dworkin’s interest in law is that it is the main word in English which 
conventionally triggers the concept; it is the concept in some largely unexamined 
way beyond the word which is of main theoretical interest to him (see the final 
section of this chapter for further discussion). 
In similar vein, though steering towards a different theoretical position, Hart’s 
former student Raz suggests (2009) that sometimes too much attention is given to 
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word meaning rather than too little. At various points he maintains that there is no 
particular need in developing a general theory of law even to use the word law (or 
the phrase the law, which he treats as roughly equivalent). It would be possible, Raz 
maintains, to talk about law ‘by talking of the system of courts and legislature and 
the rules they endorse in a state, or in other ways’. Law’s essential features, in Raz’s 
view, include claims to legitimate moral authority, being source-based, and claims 
to have peremptory force (2009:97). Each of these features, however, is a broad 
concept whose verbal formulation seems to reprise the problem of verbal meaning 
he would prefer to circumvent; the words used might designate potentially very 
many different referents, or none at all, in different historical periods and social 
systems. 
Explication of word meaning of a kind Hart, adapting Austin, had favoured was 
displaced in a shift that not only affected philosophy of law but the whole of 
analytical philosophy; and in continental philosophy discussion of words and their 
meanings set off in other directions. Fifty years on it is far less true than when Hart 
wrote it that, as he put it in his entry for ‘Jurisprudence’ in the first (1960) edition 
of the Unwin Concise Encyclopaedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers (Rée, 
1989:155), ‘the elucidation of the expression law and terms embodying 
fundamental legal concepts (e.g. rights and duties, legal personality, ownership, 
sources of law) is now regarded especially in England as an independent and 
important study.’  
Legal Meaning  
Two important considerations lose their urgency when less attention is paid to 
word meaning in the analysis of law. One is a procedural matter: how, largely 
through judicial decision, law controls verbal meaning not by one single means but 
in a number of related ways. The other is the fact that the most general words we 
use to name and describe law fit only very awkwardly into that combination of 
approaches. This section of the chapter outlines how courts rather than 
philosophers and linguists deal with legal meaning, which they do largely by 
distinguishing different interpretive categories which are subject to specific 
interpretive conventions. It also points out that, while a sophisticated, historically 
evolved strategy governs the interpretive culture of law, that interpretive culture 
exerts no direct authority over the meanings attributed to words in domains 
beyond law. As a result, words used concurrently both in legal and in other fields 
may retain or vary from understandings prescribed for them in their legal use in 
ways that are unpredictable and may be problematic. 
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Types of Vocabulary  
Words which make up the lexicon of a language are commonly distinguished into 
types, classifiable on the basis of alternative properties. Word class (or part of 
speech) is an obvious classification, which plays a role both in grammar and 
semantics. The etymology or historical origin of words offers another significant 
basis for grouping. Words are also often grouped according to usage, including 
whether they feature generally in discourse or only in specific styles (e.g. technical, 
religious, legal). Categorising some vocabulary items as technical terms and 
defining the relation that should exist (rather than necessarily does exist) between 
them and other general or ordinary words plays an important role in shaping law as 
a field.  
Many domains of language use employ technical terminology (as ‘terms of art’), 
domains including science, technology and medicine; economics and professions 
such as law and business; and sport and leisure pursuits. Law is generally 
recognised among these as creating and controlling its terms of art in a distinctive 
way. In fields based on observation, measurement or experiment, for example, one 
or more starting points in a practice or field external to language can serve to 
anchor definitions. Further terms are added and defined reciprocally but ultimately 
in relation to one or more such external reference points. In more theoretically and 
discursively constituted fields, such as theology or philosophy, for most terms 
(since these will principally be abstract words) there will be nothing concrete to 
point to, and so no external, ostensive basis for naming or definition. Correct 
usage is stipulated by whatever forms of institutional authority are sanctioned. In 
this sense many legal terms, not only acknowledged legal fictions (Fuller 1967), 
involve ‘deeming’ or declaring something to be endowed with a particular scope or 
meaning: legal practice creates or adopts its terms and stipulates their meaning not 
by reference back to something fixed and external but forwards, for the purpose of 
application to something by required deference to established legal authority. 
Categories of Words for Interpretive Purposes  
Reflecting specific features of how terminological authority is created in general, 
four general types of expression can be distinguished in legal use.  
 Some expressions are recognised legal terms of art (e.g. assumpsit, rescission, 
derogation, best endeavours). These have specialised meanings. Some are in Latin 
or of French origin (e.g. mens rea, de minimis, lien, bailment); and many have 
little or no circulation beyond law in other varieties of the language (e.g. fee 
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simple, estoppel). Some have been called ‘legal homonyms’ (Tiersma, 1999:111-
2), because one context for their use is legal while another is general, e.g. 
consideration, conversion, detriment, liable. But such expressions are not 
homonyms in the traditional sense, of different words etymologically which 
share the same form, such as bank of a river and bank as a financial 
institution. Rather, they are words whose senses are simply different enough 
that each occurs in a recognisably separate context. Potentially such terms 
could create ambiguity, but they tend not to because their alternative 
meanings are clear enough in a given context (and a reader or listener 
encountering an opaque use will recognise that some other meaning is 
intended which they have not grasped). Because terms of art become well-
established professionally, they do not need to be explained on each 
occasion among people who use or encounter them. Learning to understand 
and use such expressions is part of becoming a lawyer in the sense proposed 
by Mertz (2007).  
 Alongside such terms of art there are words explicitly defined for the 
purpose of a particular law, contract or other document and typically 
presented in its first section or alternatively in separate definition or 
interpretation clauses or an added schedule. For example, section 1 of the 
‘Addressing Bullying in Schools Act (Northern Ireland)’ 2016 defines 
‘bullying’:  
(1) In this Act “bullying” includes (but is not limited to) the repeated use of  
(a) any verbal, written or electronic communication,  
(b) any other act, or  
(c) any combination of those, by a pupil or a group of pupils against another 
pupil or group of pupils, with the intention of causing physical or emotional 
harm to that pupil or group of pupils.  
In recent UK legislation, additional explanatory notes are provided alongside 
the main legislative text (in relation to the section quoted here, those notes 
give further specification of what a ‘school’ is). In some circumstances, 
definition can be the main subject matter of a set of regulations (e.g. the UK 
Capital Gains Tax [Definition of Permanent Interest Bearing Share] 
Regulations 1999/1953). Definitions formulated along such lines are 
confined to use for the purpose of the particular document. 
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 Other words again are recognised as being in need of judicial construction 
(legal interpretation), typically because they are vague and therefore unclear 
in the applicable legislation. These are instances of Hart’s ‘open texture’, 
famously illustrated by his ‘No vehicles in the park’ example (1994 [1961]: 
126-30). For Hart, there is a kind of gradience from core to peripheral or 
penumbral exemplars in relation to prototypical instances of a category (in 
this case, regarding what a ‘vehicle’ is (for discussion see Hutton 2014)). 
Vagueness in such ‘category words’ is resolved by judicial decision: 
seemingly fuzzy scope is judicially clarified so that a definite legal outcome, 
reflecting in or out of the relevant category, can be decided.  
 There are also so-called ‘ordinary words’ of English. These are not legally 
defined, and their meaning is presumed to be generally understood or can be 
‘taken on judicial notice’ (i.e. the court does not require argument or 
evidence on the point). In a UK trademark registration application for the 
word mark LUV, for instance (Elliot’s Trade Mark Application [2014] 
R.P.C.13), the judge could declare that ‘the meanings of love are well known 
to anyone with a command of the English language’, even though the 
application was for the mark to be used on goods including sex toys and 
aids. Other counterintuitive and problematic examples include the important 
phrase beyond reasonable doubt (for discussion of difficulties created by this 
example, see Heffer this volume). 
For some words in these categories - the terms of art - a word is intended to be 
recognised as a member of its assigned category. This flags how it should be 
interpreted. With other words, context of use plays an important part in how a 
word is treated (e.g. a word used in a statute and construed by a judge primarily in 
relation to a given fact situation may have already been defined, potentially 
differently, or may be re-defined later in a different legal context). What matters 
overall is that the distinctions are governed in legislation either by definition or by 
judicial reference to interpretive aids in applying the legislation (see, within a 
massive literature on statutory interpretation, Barak 2005; Greenawalt, 2012). 
In the intricacies of this area of legal procedure it is easy to forget, however, that 
the system of normative interpretation applies only to legal use of words, even 
though many of the words used in law – notably the general terms discussed in this 
chapter – have a wide circulation in contexts where such normative rules do not 
apply. Unstipulated interpretation of estoppel is unlikely to raise problems, because 
the word is hardly used except where a legal context already exists. With legal 
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homonyms like consideration, mostly it is clear when a non-legal meaning is intended; 
if consideration is introduced in a context where it could convey a contract-like 
meaning (while the other meaning, something like either ‘detail’ or 
‘thoughtfulness’, would be more likely), then the word will probably be interpreted 
as figurative or humorous. Vague terms are slightly different. The word boat might 
be defined or construed as a kind of building for a specified legal purpose; but this 
will have minimal impact on conceptualisation of boats generally (as well as no 
decisive impact on what a boat is in a different legal context). Importantly, beyond 
law’s interpretive jurisdiction legal adjudications of word meaning may influence 
how people think but they are not binding. How serious or otherwise this 
characteristic of legal vocabulary is depends on the nature and significance of the 
word in question. It may not matter much with estoppel, consideration or boat. But 
scope for variation in what is meant by terminology indicating legal principles and 
purposes raises the politically crucial question of how far public understanding 
matches legal understanding with respect to justice, rights, authority, or the rule of law. 
Tension between Different Bases for Meaning  
There is one further complication in this interpretive landscape that must be 
mentioned: what kind of meaning, for a given expression, will satisfy an 
expectation of being the right kind? Interwoven with extensively discussed 
theoretical topics such as attributing intention and choosing between a text’s literal 
meaning or overall purpose, interpreters may relate the basis for a decided meaning 
to how language works in different ways. 
Underpinning word meaning in legal settings, there are two major alternative 
emphases in this respect. Each happens to reflect an established perspective in 
linguistic thinking: one would be described as synchronic, the other as diachronic. 
Both ultimately prescribe interpretations, and so what language means, in that, 
within whatever range of alternative interpretations exists, a singular, correct 
construction will be imposed on a problematic expression. But that stereotypical 
view of law deciding meaning depends on more subtle interaction between two 
legal norms.  
One of the two interpretive norms coincides fairly closely with the default position 
in modern linguistics. It presumes that speakers of a language internalise 
vocabulary as a network of contrasts, rather than as historical word stories 
(because a child acquires a contemporary state of the language system in which he 
or she is immersed and understands distinctions and nuance spontaneously, 
without reference to etymology or an expression’s historical development). This 
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view finds its first main expression in linguistics in the work of the early 20th 
century Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, and is then developed in several 
directions in structuralist semantics (for history and discussion, see Geeraerts, 
2010: 47-100). As regards semantic variation, the view typically takes for granted 
the homogeneity of a language community (in ideal form they are all users of the 
same common system of contrasts), subject to some qualification for dialectal or 
sociolectal, and potentially idiolectal terms. Law echoes these broad interpretive 
assumptions (in a common-sense rather than theoretical way) in its adoption of 
‘ordinary reader’ and ‘plain meaning’ approaches to interpretation. 
But there is another, contrasting historical-philological approach. That approach 
draws attention to how any expression has an origin in the language (either as a 
coining or borrowing from one or more other languages) and a traceable 
development of meanings that change over time but which may cumulatively be 
relevant to a modern social concept (e.g. ‘ethnic’, ‘family’, ‘working classes’, 
‘neighbour’, ‘torture’, ‘genocide’, ‘freedom’ or ‘justice’). This interpretive emphasis 
may also begin from contemporary use but accepts that reflection on meaning is 
deepened by familiarity with historical substrata, especially when interpreting 
documents or subject matter from or indebted to earlier periods (in practice, the 
view can range from conservative appeals to etymology as an ultimate standard 
through to historical reconstruction of a word’s history as a way of tracing 
conceptual complexity).2 Common law draws on such a historical conception in 
close reading of textual detail in precedential judgments, both as regards difficult 
words under scrutiny in a given legal case and in interpreting the language used in 
previous judicial rulings.3 This historical hermeneutic has however been specialised 
                                         
2 A number of important historical perspectives on meaning are bundled together here, though they differ in 
important respects. Among the most relevant here are these: Goodrich (1986) presents a historical and critical 
overview of hermeneutic approaches in ‘reading the law’; Geeraerts (2010:1-46) and Kay and Allan (2015) trace the 
background to philology and diachronic lexical semantics; Empson (1951) offers close readings of historically 
complex words in literature (e.g. wit, honest, sense); Skinner (1998) investigates conceptions of liberty in political 
circulation during the emergence of liberalism; Raymond Williams’s 1976 ‘Preface’ to Keywords (1976/1983) describes 
how the historical development of word meanings surfaces in conflicting efforts to understand present-day society 
and values. 
3 The term common law is itself interesting in this respect. There is the clear modern meaning (a system of law applied 
by judges based on cases and precedent, in contrast with civil law or civilian systems); there is the historical meaning 
(the imposition on a previously regional legal system of a greater degree of standardisation, achieved in England 
from the 12th century onwards by a unified system of courts combined with travelling judges, as introduced by 
Henry II); and there is a third meaning which combines historical reality with myth and can colour the other two: 
that of law ‘shared or available to all’, a use foregrounded especially when ‘our’ is placed in front: ‘our common law’. 
This third use, combined with the historical sense, presents a glowing image of community ownership of law ‘since 
time immemorial’. Any such image of ‘time immemorial’ is difficult to justify, however, either to mean ‘always’ or 
even in doctrinal use to indicate time before legal memory (i.e. any time before the accession of Richard I in 1189). 
The main political settlements that have shaped common law’s relation to the modern population come later, in 
shifts from feudalism into capitalism and from the assumed divine right of kings into representative, Parliamentary 
democracy, by way of events including the Civil War, tyrannicide, Bill of Rights, colonial domination overseas and 
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in a particular direction in common law reasoning, especially in higher courts. The 
repeated practice of judicial construction in so many cases has engaged successive 
generations of judges in seeking to resolve, or at least in commenting on, 
interpretive problems to do with words and phrases as they arose.  
Arguably it is the combination of these nuanced ideas of meaning that creates law’s 
(at least common law’s) rich interpretive culture. Exactly how courts and other 
tribunals triangulate between the different viewpoints outlined above is 
nevertheless not easy to describe, because interpretation is embedded in kinds of 
reasoning which are frequently articulated in other terms. Detailed reasoning about 
meaning may be presented as much by emphasising that the relevant authority is 
good as that the linguistic argument is good. 
Cluster of ‘Key’ Words  
With relevant contexts now in place - that is, the existence of a debate about what 
word meaning contributes to legal concepts and the use in law of a range of 
interpretive strategies that nevertheless do not govern word meaning beyond law - 
it is time to address more directly which words are worth investigating as the 
cluster of words I claim show significant semantic indeterminacy in their different 
uses. 
Use of the term ‘cluster’ here involves a commitment to the idea that words are 
not mere atoms of conceptual content but relate to other words as members of 
lexical fields within the overall lexicon. The least committing version of this idea is 
hardly controversial, either intuitively or in structuralist linguistics from Saussure 
onwards. But the precise basis on which such groupings are decided has been 
subjected to considerable scrutiny and the most apt terminology for use in the 
present case cannot be presumed.4 Whatever term is adopted, exact membership of 
what I will call simply a ‘cluster’ cannot be fixed definitively. Nor can an overall 
number of members. Word clusters are elastic networks, linking to adjacent 
semantic domains in different ways. This characteristic is especially notable where 
the words in question are abstract and polysemous, because patterns of similarity 
                                                                                                                               
more recent independence movements and wars. For discussion of further difficulties with this expression regarding 
exactly what areas and aspects of law it applies to, see also Glanville Williams (1945:302) 
 
4 The concept of, and history of theories related to, lexical fields is traced in detail in Geeraerts (2010: 52-70). The 
loosest relationship is simply between words used in a general conceptual or thematic domain; but many such words 
may not be restricted to or specialised for use in that domain. A stronger requirement is be that words should show 
a measured likelihood of co-occurrence; and a still stronger requirement might insist on semantic relationships such 
as synonymy, antonymy, and hyponymy between members. What is called a ‘lexical set’ is bound by interlocking 




and contrast around them depend on which sense is activated in signaling a 
particular relation. So it is far more difficult to justify membership of words in a 
semantic field of abstract terms about law - where the main point to be made 
about such terms is that they are polysemous and vague - than to group concrete 
terms which form part of a recognizable schema (e.g. table, chairs, knives and forks 
and vase of flowers, while excluding donkey, microscope, and serenity). 
Despite difficulties with word groups in general, there seem good reasons to want 
to think of the general terminology of law as a cluster. First, many words appear 
uncontroversial as prominent words naming or describing the social institution and 
values of law. Those words, it would seem, should occur frequently in 
jurisprudence and, if less prominently, in related fields including ‘law and society’, 
constitutional law, and political theory. Secondly - but in ways that turn out to be 
complicated - candidate words seem as if they should relate to each other 
according to an established taxonomy of sense relationships (such as synonymy, 
antonymy, or hyponymy). 
This second expectation presents challenges as regards what the basis is of 
connections between prospective members of the cluster. Order and rule both seem 
obvious candidates for inclusion, for instance. In one of the senses of each, the 
two are near-synonyms for (and so might be grouped with) legally important 
command, despite awkwardness when separating out their meanings as nouns and as 
verbs. In another sense of each, though, the two words signify the abstract social 
purpose, state or outcome of law as a system, not a single instruction; and in this 
sense they enter into different semantic relationships with surrounding words (e.g. 
they are closer to regime or governance). Or consider how justice invites being seen as a 
superordinate (or hyperonym) of law. Law is one among a number of ways of 
achieving justice (there are alternatives such as charity or political initiative) but 
‘being just’ can appear a necessary feature or entailment of law. Such semantic 
relationships, when stated, can appear extremely reductive, however. The relation 
between the two words law and justice can be seen to be more complicated by 
considering the celebrated maxim sometimes held to encapsulate natural law: ‘unjust 
law is no law’ (or, switching the sense of law from abstract to concrete in both 
instances, ‘an unjust law is not a law’). The meaning of this maxim, as translated 
from Latin injusta lex non est lex, has been debated from renderings of Aristotle 
onwards, through St Augustine and Aquinas, up to the present; and the semantic 
relationship between its main terms appears crucial to claims which surround it and 
their ramifications. Whether in Latin or English, the maxim seems to confirm that 
law entails ‘justice’, since law without justice is said not to be law. But it also affirms 
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the opposite: that there is potentially a class of law (i.e. unjust law) which lacks 
justice. Arguably part of the maxims memorable, self-contradictory effect results 
from tension created precisely by uncertainty regarding the semantic relationship 
between law and justice. 
Word nets devised primarily on the basis of semantic relationships and applied to 
abstract semantic domains often seem crude and reductive in this way. 
Intersections of meaning between polysemous, abstract words do not fit easily into 
established semantic categories or neat tree diagrams. Rather, the meaning relations 
between them are a kaleidoscopic movement of facets and relations, criss-crossing 
in ways that invite but elude definitive description. A purely ‘semantic relations’ 
approach would simplify details of conceptualisation in a given context of use and 
cut off any given meaning from its relevant lexical history, textual tradition, or 
surrounding ideas. 
It is important in selecting general ‘law’ words, however, not to allow difficulties of 
this kind to eclipse the value of describing relationships between words and 
concepts by considering them as a ‘cluster’. But which words should be included? 
Here, as the outcome of an informal process combining introspection, general 
reading, and consulting dictionaries and thesauruses, is a provisional selection 
(based on apparent family resemblances, observed tendency to occur together, and 
in some cases to create an appearance of more systematic semantic relations). 
1. A minimal list should include law, justice and right(s), as well as words based on 
lex and leg- (a formation etymologically unrelated to law) including legal and the 
principle of legality. Something is considered law or law-related if it is named or 
described by any of these words.5 Equity may also fit in this first group, as a further 
word indicating an area, type or quality of law, though the word’s development 
complicates that categorisation. Leaving aside financial meanings of equity, use of 
Equity with capital E in British English suggests a hyponym of law: a particular 
division within the English legal system, initially a route of direct appeal to the 
sovereign in the person of the Lord Chancellor, bypassing common law courts; 
                                         
5 The first chapter of Jeremy Bentham’s Of Laws in General (first published 1780, but held back for nine years by the 
author during which time he claimed that half the printed sheets had been devoured by rats) is concerned with ‘how 
a law may be considered in eight different respects’ (each the subject of a separate later chapter). Bentham 
emphasises ‘the necessity of these verbal discussions’, and analyses why no other word than law in English ‘would 
answer the purpose as well’ in conveying our distinctive concept of law. Bentham examines the relative merits of 
other words that ‘come into competition with’ law, including command, commandment, order, injunction, decree, precept, 
specialist, ordinance and edict, constitution, regulation, establishment, institutional, and mandate. The modern Athlone Press 
edition of this work (1970) was edited by the positivist legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart, discussed above as having 




then later, the distinct Courts of Equity until absorbed into the court system by the 
Judicature Acts of the 1870s. Alternatively, however, equity might be considered a 
meronym of law (a part or quality of what law is: its fairness and even-handedness, 
resulting in ‘equitable’ treatment). Other words here include regulation, bringing 
with it a distinction likely to problematize the scope of law in any discussion of that 
word’s vagueness: between hard law and soft law. Regulation itself is both vague and 
contested among policy makers and professionals, cutting across earlier relations 
between state and market and between public and private actors in the delivery of 
law. This might also be the place for jurisprudence, whose meaning is both ‘body of 
law including case law’ (e.g. ‘jurisprudence of the European court’) and ‘science of 
human laws in general; philosophy of law’. 
2. Given the historical centrality of arguments between positive and natural law 
approaches to what law is, morality appears an important word in the variable 
synthesis of notions expressed in law. Modifying terms which combine with law, 
including divine, natural, and positive warrant inclusion here. Note, however, that 
parallel expressions in form may not be symmetrical in meaning: natural law 
denotes a legal and philosophical tradition from ancient Greek origins onwards, 
concerned with aspects of law including divine provenance, universals, and human 
reason; natural rights, important in political changes during the 18th century, denotes 
human rights considered inherent or inalienable but ridiculed by Bentham as 
‘nonsense upon stilts’; natural justice is a narrower, originally 17th-century doctrine, 
that anyone whose rights are affected by an official decision should be entitled to 
advance notice and a fair hearing before an unbiased judge (a principle now more 
often known, as expressed using other words within the same cluster of general 
terms, as right to a fair hearing). 
3. Also to be added should be words which indicate the basis on which, or 
premises from which, general concepts of law are derived: legitimate and authority 
seem obvious here. Other related words include impartiality and fair, but these seem 
less particularly legal (they are arguably used mostly in a wider social context, in 
this respect similarly to the otherwise undoubtedly central terms public/private, 
reason/reasonable, and interest, including public interest and best interest). In the 
development of law generally and international law in particular, customary is also 
important.  
4. Overlapping with the preceding group, next might be words concerned with 
values that law aspires to or protects, and desired social conditions that systems of 
law seem calculated to bring about: order (in its abstract, ‘system’ sense), freedom, 
liberty, civil liberties, liberties of the subject (plural but less, rather than more, than 
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singular abstract liberty because restricted by being possessed by someone who is 
only a ‘subject’), and similarly qualified freedom under the law. This grouping might 
also include equality, extending to equality before the law as well as, in litigation, equality 
of arms. 
5. A further sub-group appears salient in showing how law is expressed and relates 
to other social values and structures, including power: power itself (including 
different meanings when shifted from abstract to concrete and when used in the 
plural: delegated, discretionary, and special powers); also, coercion, command, obligation, 
binding, duty, and enforcement. Inclusion of particular words here depends again on 
the particular sense in which they are understood: power is part of one semantic 
grouping when used to signify an abstract resource potentially monopolised or 
distributable by a (human, institutional or symbolic) sovereign, but in another group 
when specifying some particular delegated jurisdiction or agency. In turn jurisdiction 
meshes with one grouping in its abstract meaning of ‘authority’ or ‘competence’, 
but another when specifying a place or institution in which a particular authority is 
exercised. In turn authority… The potentially circular connections and definitions 
which result from such categorization, with one expression glossed by surrounding 
terms in the same group, is of course not specific to this field but a general 
problem of definition; it may even strengthen a sense that the words should be 
viewed as a group rather than individually.  
6. At a further remove from core ‘naming’ terms come expressions which denote 
general characteristics of a polity: democracy, and governance, representation and 
representative, constitution, separation of powers, policy, state. These valuably foreground the 
constitutive (and constitutional) rather than coercive dimension of law, but as regards 
their place in this cluster seem likely to appear primarily political rather than legal 
words. 
A feeling may already have taken hold, at some point during this exercise, of 
beginning to deal with different kinds of word: some less abstract, or in a different 
field, possibly with less of a naming or descriptive role in relation to law. Perhaps 
some kind of limit should therefore be imposed, perhaps after group 5 or if not 
there after group 6? Or would it be better to reverse the process and think of 
words which should not be included? Reasons for exclusion of marginal cases 
might include not being used frequently enough, or having only a technical rather 
than also a general meaning, or seeming to be at the wrong level of generality. 
There is a group of words, for example, which all show some degree of relevant 
polysemy and vagueness but describe institutions more than they do law as a 
concept: court, trial, case, hearing, tribunal; and there are words with similar properties 
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for legal actors including judge, advocate, party. And there are words which denote 
values or principles prominent in law but whose currency has not extended into 
general vocabulary: habeas corpus and ultra vires, as well as arguably prerogative and 
proportionality. 
Given the informality of the process adopted for choosing words as members, 
what I am calling a ‘cluster’ of key terms cannot be more than an intuitive word 
web. Various methods could be adopted to refine the process, ranging from corpus 
linguistic frequency-of-occurrence measures to double-coding protocols using 
agreed criteria for decisions made by researcher readers.6 Even as informally as this 
exercise has been conducted, however, an impulse to cluster does not stop easily: it 
is difficult to think about any one of the above words without cross-referring to 
others. In the most general sense, therefore, they are a cluster. Collectively, such 
words designate – they lexicalise as far as any words can, albeit in historically and 
culturally specific ways – some fundamental level of what law is. Yet for all that the 
most general words of law, which Raz treats as mostly unproblematic because they 
form ‘part of the common terminology of practical discourse in general’ (Raz 
2009:30) remain elusive both in their meaning individually and in the semantic 
relationships they enter into with each other. 
Polysemy, Vagueness and Contestability 
In the face of such classificatory difficulty, it is important to return to the reason 
for considering this open-ended group of words as a ‘cluster’. This section 
develops in greater detail an account of how words of the general type included in 
the cluster behave in terms of their meaning. First I summarise aspects of meaning 
I consider significant. Concern here is no longer only with what the words mean in 
legal settings, but with any given word’s semantic footprint across all its different 
contexts of use. Then I take one word – law itself – for more detailed illustration. 
Looking closely at just one word, for reasons of space, restricts comparative 
discussion (though some reference is necessarily made to connections radiating out 
to other words). Law was chosen as my example because - as the word was shown 
above to be for some philosophers of law - law is emblematic in designating the 
conceptual domain signalled by words including law, justice, rights, and regulation. The 
                                         
6 Approaches to using corpus linguistic techniques for identifying and analysing key words in given fields include 
Stubbs (2001), which presents case studies on particular words and phrases based on a combination of traditional 
concepts such as lexical field, sense relations, and collocation with more recent corpus techniques; and Baker and 
McEnery (2015), which uses and also reflects on methods for identifying words and phrases that are simultaneously 




word law also exemplifies fairly clearly the main points about meaning that would 
need to be highlighted equivalently in other words considered to be in the cluster. 
Multiple Senses 
One pronounced feature of words identified as members of the cluster I am 
describing (though also shown in a less marked way by many other words) is their 
polysemy. Polysemy occurs when a word has more than one distinct sense and 
where its multiple senses are felt by native speakers to be related (Cruse, 1986). A 
textbook example is mouth (of a face) and mouth (of a river). The ‘river mouth’ sense 
appears a figurative extension from the form and function of a human mouth, and 
has become on this basis an additional, conventional meaning. Virtually all the 
words discussed in the previous section are polysemous in this way. Different 
relationships exist, however, between polysemous senses. These include hyponymy 
(where as mentioned above one sense denotes a type of the entity denoted by 
another sense) and meronymy (where one sense denotes a part of the entity 
denoted by another sense). Senses at different levels of concreteness or abstraction 
are also common. So is figurative extension by means of tropes such as metaphor 
and metonymy. Historically, polysemous senses arise from processes of semantic 
change including sense widening and narrowing, amelioration and pejoration (see 
Kay and Allan, 2015:25-48). While it is unremarkable that words show polysemy in 
this way, the consequences for interpretation seem particularly significant in law 
because of the importance law attaches to consistent use of words even if, beyond 
law, other meanings with different degrees of closeness to the legal meanings may 
be ascribed to the same word. 
One effect of polysemy on interpretation can be ambiguity, which arises when 
more than one sense is activated for a word simultaneously, often intentionally. 
This can create uncertainty as to what was meant. For ambiguity to arise (which in 
most kinds of discourse is relatively uncommon, because one meaning will typically 
fit a given context better than another), two conditions need to apply: an 
expression must have more than one established meaning; and the interpreter must 
either entertain an extraneous or incorrect reading or alternatively find it difficult 
to decide what the intended meaning was. In poetry, religious discourse, jokes and 
some other kinds of discourse, ambiguity can also work in another way. An 
interpreter may be encouraged to entertain the multiple meanings simultaneously. 
Ambiguity of this kind can be created either by lexical characteristics (alternative 
meanings for a particular word) or by syntax (alternative parsings of a grammatical 
structure). In legal drafting, major efforts are made to avoid ambiguity because it 
creates a kind of indeterminacy which calls not for acceptable ‘filling in’ of 
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meaning by judges, as vagueness may, but instead an apparently additional 
interpretive decision that may be perceived as encroaching on the role of the 
legislature.  
Another, under-acknowledged consequence of multiple senses is confusion of level 
between concrete and abstract meanings. Different senses related in this way exist 
for most words in the cluster, as can sometimes be seen in their grammatical 
behavior, especially whether they can be preceded by an article the/a, and whether 
they also occur in the plural. As Chomsky cautions, however (1965: ii, 64), the 
relation between countable and mass words in grammar does not map directly 
onto the concrete/ abstract distinction: in his example, boy is a count noun distinct 
both from the mass noun butter (which is still concrete but not countable) and from 
abstract sincerity. Some examples appear straightforward: ‘a rule of law’ (countable 
and concrete, a specific legal measure) as compared with ‘the rule of law’ (an 
abstract – as well as historically complex, culturally varying, and hotly disputed – 
political value). But other examples shift meaning in apparently minor yet 
sometimes important ways. The difference between concrete order (‘command’) 
and abstract order (‘arrangement’, ‘system’) has already been noted. But there is a 
further distinction within use of the second of those senses: order in one meaning is 
something that law should consistently uphold, while politically and socially it 
should not show itself to be partisan to a given order (in the first of these two uses 
order is abstract but not countable, while in the second it is both abstract and 
countable).7 
In highlighting the importance of concrete and abstract senses, it is important not 
to lose sight of how this distinction within the senses of a polysemous word 
interacts with other facets of conceptualisation to produce intricate shadings of 
meaning far beyond easily enumerable senses. Staying with order, an array of 
philosophical and historical nuances opens up. Philosophical meanings of order 
have been described especially clearly in Finnis (1980:136-9), who identifies four 
uses as aspects of one single general meaning: ‘a set of unifying relationships’. The 
                                         
7 The difference between these senses of order is emphasised in relation to the phrase law-and-order in Raymond 
Williams’s final discussion of ‘keywords’ in his 1985 essay ‘Mining the Meaning: Key Words in the Miners’ Strike’ 
(Williams, 1989). Williams suggests that four words were crucial during this major industrial dispute, which Williams 
felt involved ‘the dislocation of our habitual social order’: management, economic, community, and law-and-order. Of the last 
of these words, he comments, ‘I take this as a single word, as it is currently used […] For it is the arbitrary 
combination of what should be two quite different words and concepts that is the key to its contemporary 
ideological effects… Listening to some ministers, it is easy to pick up their real sense of order, which is command: 
obedience to lawful authority; indeed, when combined with the ‘right to manage’, obedience to all authority… What 
is at issue, in any conflict about a particular law, is the underlying definition of the desired social order. (Williams 




first kind, for Finnis, is ‘natural order’ that we do not ourselves bring about: ‘the 
order studied by the natural sciences’ (in describing this kind of order Finnis 
excludes the related, purposive ‘watchmaker’ alternative: ‘divine order’). Finnis’s 
second ‘order’ is what humans ‘bring into understanding’ in creating internally 
coherent knowledge and reason. Thirdly, there is ‘order’ imposed by humans onto 
whatever matter around them is subject to their powers (e.g. systematic use of 
inventions or the products of technology); and fourthly, there is the ‘order’ or state 
of unity brought about ‘by intelligently deliberating and choosing’, an order of 
social interaction, management and communal organisation. For Finnis, what 
matters most about these recognized senses is how they pave the way for a notion 
of ‘human community’, and so require law to be understood in terms of 
interpersonal connections rather than purely at the level of an individual legal 
subject. But arguably what makes the four kinds of order (which postulate different 
origins, states of nature, and creative agency) more generally important is that they 
lend real or symbolic weight in different historical periods to more complex uses of 
the word (Foucault 2001, though note that the French title of this work – Les mots 
et les choses - does not contain the word order).8 In a hierarchical extension of the 
basic meaning of ‘series’, order has been used to denote social or professional rank, 
status or class (e.g. orders of monks or knights), as well as status in other social 
institutions or conventional arrangements (e.g. order of wedlock). It has also been 
used normatively to denote a harmonious condition of everything being ‘correct’, 
‘in a healthy state’ and ‘in its place’, even ‘normality’ (in contrast with out of order 
and disorder). But complications follow, including whether a particular use of order is 
descriptive or ascriptive (or one of these dissembling the epistemological status of 
the other). An order of plants in biology may seem to fall in Finnis’s first category, of 
‘order out there in the world’ (though it might be better understood as combining 
properties of his first and second categories); alphabetical order may seem an example 
of Finnis’s third kind (a human-made, technological convention). But what about 
abstract religious order or concrete ‘a religious order’? Such order, or such an order, 
may lay claim to derivation from divine order, while being in obvious respects a 
human-made institution. And what, then, about feudal order, legal order, or New World 
Order (the last of these in all its various intellectual and political 20th-century 
manifestations)? Such usages absorb several different, even potentially conflicting 
dimensions and resonances of what order means. 
 
                                         





Vagueness is more significant in legal language than ambiguity although, like 
ambiguity, it combines with effects of polysemy where the vagueness in question is 
only of a particular sense rather than in an expression’s overall meaning. The 
phenomenon has been extensively analysed not only in philosophy of language 
(e.g. in close connection with semantic indeterminacy more generally in Quine 
1960:125-9) but also in legal construction and adjudication, including how 
vagueness can be useful to law-makers (Endicott, 2000). It has also been examined 
in detail by Waldron in relation to the US doctrine of ‘void-for-vagueness’ 
(Waldron, 1994). 
To summarise Waldron’s impressive, formally set out description, an expression is 
vague if it is imprecise in the sense that there are: objects or instances within the 
domain of the expression’s usual use where an interpreter will be unable to decide 
whether the object or instance falls within the meaning of the expression or not, 
and where the interpreter who finds herself or himself in such a position attributes 
that inability-to-decide to the expression’s meaning rather than to a lack of further 
information (Waldron 1994:513). Waldron’s example is the colour term blue. Most 
people, he says, would hesitate when shown various colour patches in deciding 
whether some shade of turquoise or lavender is or is not blue, or whether it is 
borderline.  
In Word and Object, Quine (1960:126-7) points out that a general term for physical 
objects can in fact be vague in this way in more than one respect: the general term 
mountain, he notes, is vague in relation to how much terrain each indisputable 
mountain occupies, and it is vague in terms of what lesser eminences should count 
as a mountain at all. For many words, vagueness of these kinds raises questions 
about the different approaches to categories already alluded to: Aristotelian 
‘necessary and sufficient conditions’ accounts; ‘prototype and goodness-of-
exemplar’ understandings associated first with ‘family resemblance concepts’ in 
Wittgenstein, then with prototype theory in psychology; and legal ‘open texture’ as 
discussed in Hart.  
Vagueness has tended to be a less prominent topic in linguistic semantics than in 
law, being treated in pragmatics instead as an aspect of contextual modulation of 
meaning by inference (e.g. Sperber and Wilson 2005); in law, the difference 
between meanings which are conventional aspects of a word and meanings which 
are constructed by inference is not consistently drawn. Vagueness of expressions is 
discussed in law in many contexts, especially in relation to conceptual categories, as 
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above; in relation to so-called trivial vagueness (where a general rather than precise 
expression has been used unadvisedly or as inappropriate hedging introduced into 
a legal document); in discussion of the boundary between vagueness and 
arbitrariness; and regarding the vagueness of general evaluative terms such as 
reasonable (Soames, 2011). 
Contestability 
The third kind of indeterminacy of meaning that commonly arises with general 
legal terminology scarcely features in treatments of meaning in linguistics. But it is 
important across the range of uses of the ‘law words’ under discussion in this 
chapter.  
The meaning of an expression can be said to be contestable if the expression 
communicates an evaluative (often called appraisive) force but at the same time 
exhibits incompatible characteristics or elements which offer alternative ways of 
satisfying that same evaluative judgement. The most well-known account of 
contestability in this sense is to be found in an article by the philosopher W. B. 
Gallie (1956) concerned with concepts rather than verbal expressions. In Gallie’s 
account, controversially discussed under the description he coined of ‘essentially 
contested concepts’, for contestability to exist there must also be a history of 
struggle between alternative criteria involved in efforts to secure a ‘proper’ 
meaning for the expression/concept. Among Gallie’s examples are concepts 
expressed by words including art, democracy, and social justice (as well as what he calls 
an ‘artificial example’, of championship and champions). Waldron’s discussion 
(Waldron 1994) sifts carefully through Gallie’s detailed criteria governing whether a 
concept satisfies the conditions of being ‘essentially contested’ (‘essentially’ 
meaning in respect of its essence, rather than merely ‘intensively’). The example 
Waldron then analyses in more detail (Waldron 1994: 529-34), based on Gallie’s 
discussion, is that of democracy, which can be considered contestable because of 
three linked conditions:  
(1)  democracy can be explicated in terms of political representation but it is not 
implausible alternatively to explicate the word’s meaning in terms of direct 
participation in government;  
(2)  democracy has a favourable evaluative meaning, such that people want to and 
feel democracy should be promoted; and  
(3)  because of the two preceding conditions, a history has built up of using 
democracy to embody what nevertheless remain rival political principles (e.g. 
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‘every political system should have a representative structure’; and ‘we ought 
to encourage direct popular participation in government’).  
By analogy with this illustration, it is easy to see that many expressions in the 
cluster of law-naming or law-designating words introduced above are contestable 
in this sense. Gallie mentions liberty and social justice in this context; and the interests of 
justice, law and order, authority, legitimacy, and basic human rights are all similarly 
amenable to such analysis (though their contestability can of course be overridden 
by normative interpretation in a legal setting). It should be noted, nevertheless, 
that, since contestability in this sense only applies to words which involve an 
appraisive force (i.e. they are evaluative and implicitly encourage pursuit of 
acclamation for a particular conception of the contested word or concept), this 
kind of semantic indeterminacy is unlikely to be found in many other words in the 
cluster identified above. 
The Word Law 
In light of these fairly abstract distinctions about meaning and semantic 
indeterminacy, now consider the word law in more detail, taking this word as an 
example of the kinds of complexity I claim make general words for and about law 
difficult in legal-lay communication. As a way into examining law, the word, rather 
than slipping directly into the concept or concepts it is taken to convey, the Oxford 
English Dictionary (OED) is an obvious place to start (especially if read in 
conjunction with concise or pocket dictionaries and with dictionaries compiled on 
different lexicographical principles such as COBUILD publications).9 This is not 
only because of the OED’s acknowledged authority but because it is compiled on 
historical principles and offers a range of related resources.10 First I offer an outline 
of what the OED says about law; then I address the significance of considering 
word meaning in ways the dictionary opens up in thinking about legal concepts. 
The OED entry for law has not been fully revised since 1902 but contains draft 
additions up to 2004. Strictly there are five headword entries for law: four nouns 
and a verb. The four nouns cover meanings of: ‘a body of rules’ (the entry mainly 
discussed below); ‘score, share of expense’; ‘round or conical hill’; and an 
                                         
9 All modern dictionaries base their headwords and entry content on computerised linguistic corpora. But some 
(including Collins COBUILD dictionaries) also adopt a policy of ordering meanings based on attested frequency in 
their corpus. For detailed analysis of the COBUILD project, see Sinclair (1987). 
10 The OED is best now thought of as an online publication (www.oed.com ). In print, it was first published in parts 
as A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles, eds, J.A.H.Murray, H.Bradley, W.A.Craigie & C.T.Onions (OUP, 
Oxford, 1884-1928); 2nd edition 1989; 3rd edition in progress. See the OED webpage for details of and articles about 
related resources including the Historical Thesaurus of the Oxford English Dictionary (HTOED). 
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interjection sense conveying surprise or dismay, ‘Oh law!’). The verb means 
roughly ‘ordain’ or ‘render lawful’ but is virtually obsolete. 
The entry for law as ‘a body of rules’ begins with information about pronunciation, 
variant word forms, relative frequency of use (Band 7, among the top 1000 words 
in English), and etymology. A pop-up gives a timeline of first attestation for each 
recorded sense (with peaks in the number of new senses in early 17th century and 
mid-19th century), as well as a separate timeline of sense development (showing 
dates and duration for each). To represent the word’s various senses, four Roman-
numeral major branches provide an overall structure, divided into 20 numbered 
principal senses (sub-divided in turn into lettered senses making a total of 51 
recorded senses). Each sense – it is conceivable that fewer or more could be 
distinguished by what lexicographers call further ‘splitting’ or ‘lumping’ together - 
is traced to its first attestation (and final date of recorded use, where obsolete); 
each is also annotated with usage information (e.g. ‘rare’ or ‘archaic’). The senses 
are each also illustrated by quotations accompanied by the name of their author 
and the date of publication (578 in total, with a timeline of sources for the 
quotations provided in another pop-up). Following this detailed listing of the 
word’s senses when it is used as a separate form, equivalent information is 
provided for related compounds (e.g. law enforcement). All this semantic information 
can be combined with a thesaurus approach to meaning – in philological terms, an 
onamasiological rather than semasiological perspective - by cross-referencing to 
HTOED (the OED’s historical thesaurus, Kay and Allan 2015: 92-112). Such 
cross-referencing makes it possible to connect with the semantic field in which law 
has been used by examining cognate terms for each sense at different points in the 
period during which English law developed (terms including assize (1303), droit 
(1480), jure (1496), and words for legal science including juristics (1837) and nomology 
(1880)).  
Scaled back from such richness of evidence, in outline the modern word law might 
be described as follows. Law emerges from Late Old English lagu (c1000), a form 
derived in turn from Old Norse lag, ‘something laid down or fixed’. The native 
word in Old English had been ǽ. The OED also notes that, ‘as law is the usual 
English rendering of Latin lex, and to some extent of Latin jus, and of Greek νόμος, 
its development of senses has been in some degree affected by the uses of these 
words’. (Further discussion of the significance and legacy of these origins, with 
particular regard to European philosophy, law and politics, can be found in entries 
for the respective words in Cassin 2014.)  
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Three of the word’s four main branches of meaning in the OED entry have titles: 
‘I. A rule of conduct imposed by authority’; ‘II. Without reference to an external 
commanding authority’; and ‘III. ‘Scientific and philosophical uses’. The fourth, 
unnamed branch contains only one sense, s20: ‘Allowance in time or distance 
made to an animal that is to be hunted, or to one of the competitors in a race, in 
order to ensure equal conditions.’ It is the three named senses which give both the 
general concept of law and, in the relation between Branch 1 and Branch 3, show 
significant conflicts in social thinking that have complicated the word’s 
development and current use. 
The first branch (‘rule of conduct imposed by authority’) compresses into a single 
grouping senses covering two vast areas of law, ‘human’ and ‘divine’. Within 
‘human’, the dictionary also deals with both customary and positive law. Alongside 
the three other branches, this telescoping gives some idea of the scale and scope of 
this word that has been condensed into what is still a lengthy analysis. Human law 
(s1-8), from about 1100, covers: ‘the body of rules, whether proceeding from 
formal enactment or from custom, which a particular state or community 
recognizes as binding on its members or subjects.’ As a whole it is this branch 
which distinguishes the most familiar meanings: ‘legal system’, a ‘code or system of 
rules’; ‘one of the individual rules which constitute the ‘law’ of a state or polity’; 
and ‘the condition of society characterized by the observance of the laws’. This 
branch also notes use of law to mean substantive area of law (law ‘divided, 
according to the matter with which it is concerned’); and traces use of law ‘in 
contradistinction to equity’.  Law is also exemplified meaning ‘legal profession’, and 
to signify legal proceedings: ‘action of the courts of law, as a means of procuring 
redress of grievances or enforcing claims; judicial remedy’. 
Perhaps what is most striking, however, to a modern reader accustomed to the 
reach of administrative legal measures in securing policy or social engineering goals 
(e.g. specifying taxation details, correcting for market failure, or stipulating food 
standards), is the second prong of this first branch: the extent and variety of uses 
that signify ‘divine law’ (ss9-16). Some of these senses are not recorded after the 
16th century but some remained current until the end of the 19th century. Such 
senses range from ‘The body of commandments which express the will of God 
with regard to the conduct of His intelligent creatures’ through divine law as 
‘implanted by nature in the human mind, or as capable of being demonstrated by 
reason’, to ‘The system of moral and ceremonial precepts contained in the 
Pentateuch’, ‘the law of Moses, the Mosaic or Jewish law’; and broadest of all, law 
meaning ‘a religious system’. 
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Branch 2 (which traces uses ‘without reference to an external commanding 
authority’) is less relevant to legal discussion. It does, however, evoke how 
grounded in custom and convention other senses may be. Section 14, for instance, 
deals with ‘Custom, customary rule or usage; habit, practice’, and later senses 
illustrate uses to mean ‘rule of action or procedure; one of the rules defining 
correct procedure in an art or department of action, or in a game’ (examples here 
include rules of the card game whist, rules for hospitality, codes of honour, and the 
law of the jungle). How far these are meanings ‘without reference to an external 
commanding authority’ must depend on the particular case but also inevitably to 
some extent depends on the meaning given to polysemous authority (itself a very 
substantial entry in the OED). 
Branch 3 begins (in s17) with what law means in the ‘sciences of observation’ and 
in the ‘physical sciences’, broadly from the 17th century onwards. In sciences of 
observation, law (here as a count noun) signifies ‘a theoretical principle deduced 
from particular facts, applicable to a defined group or class of phenomena, and 
expressible by the statement that a particular phenomenon always occurs if certain 
conditions be present’. This is the sense condensed in a less technical rendering as 
one of the meanings in Dr Johnson’s Dictionary (1755): ‘Law, an established and 
constant mode or process; a fixed correspondence of cause and effect.’ In the 
physical sciences, on the other hand, law is ‘called more explicitly law of nature or 
natural law’; and some quotations here, selected prior to 1902, reflect a tension 
between divine origin, human perception and reasoning. Illustrative quotations 
include Boyle’s ‘The Wisdome of God does... confine the Creatures to the 
establish'd Laws of Nature’ (1665), and Locke’s, ‘A Law of Nature… something 
that we may attain to the knowledge of, by our natural Faculties’ (1694). Further 
quotations indicate domains in which such laws obtain, including general laws of 
motion, the universal law of gravitation, laws of reasoning, and Grimm’s law in 
philology.  
Law and Concepts of Law 
How much illumination can be expected from reading one OED entry in this way? 
This question is approached by considering the law entry itself first, and then in 
comments on my use of law as an example of complexity claimed to exist in most 
or all words in the cluster of legal ‘key’ words. 
The OED entry for law illustrates a series of points made above. It shows legal and 
other uses of law across various fields and discourse types: law, religion, science, 
games, and hunting. Its four branches and 51 recorded senses confirm that law is 
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highly polysemous in the view of lexicographers. The word’s range of senses varies 
on a number of dimensions: different subject areas, degree of technicality 
(including in different fields), degree of generality and potential for vagueness, 
degree of concreteness and abstractness, and social register. On an assumption that 
meaning in at least some cases involves representation of the speaker’s beliefs, the 
meanings also reflect significant differences between historical periods of thinking. 
Some views expressed in the various senses, and in accompanying quotations, are 
now to be found only in historical sources – part of a cultural substratum of 
modern legal thinking – while others remain current and amount to socially 
dominant current understandings. Others again are current but likely to be 
confined to the thinking of specialised, minority social or interest groups.  
Together, this range shows the social-semantic footprint of law as a word of 
English. 
The dictionary makes no attempt to extend its encyclopaedic information, and 
does not comment on the relative spread, weight, uptake or influence of ideas 
represented in the various senses. But by no means all the senses reported are in 
fields distant from what a lawyer or philosopher of law thinks of as ‘law’ or 
relevant to law; and many of the varying senses are not trivial in relation to a 
lawyer’s or philosopher’s concerns. Some, in fact, are expressions of major 
alternatives or lines of argument related to the general legal meaning of law. In this 
way, many of the senses reported chart uses of the word that a reader might expect 
to encounter in a legal or jurisprudential argument, and whose significance within 
such an argument he or she might wish to assess as precisely as possible.  
The word’s main complexities, however, are not in any one sense or in the word’s 
range of senses. Rather, they concern unresolved blending, intersection or 
interstices between senses of the kind introduced above in relation to order, 
including points at which meanings are positioned in relation to one another in an 
overall field. One major complication, which runs through the history of legal 
thinking as well as through debates about the legal systems of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
states, resembles the point made above by reference to the condensed natural law 
maxim ‘unjust law is no law’: how far law implies moral grounding for rules it 
articulates, in a manner analogous to justice. Historically this issue is central to 
religious and philosophical, as well as legal, debate about natural law and positive law. 
In OED s15, law does convey a ‘justice’ meaning: ‘what is considered right or 
proper; justice or correctness of conduct’. But that meaning became obsolete in 
English around 1500. Unsurprisingly, the thesaurus link for s15 sense is to words 
with moral or ethical resonances: right, justice and rightfulness (and may suggest 
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semantic differentiation taking place between the two words during the period, in 
the context of late Mediaeval reinterpretations of Classical legal thinking). How far 
law retains such an implied, residual meaning has now to be assessed based on a 
view taken of its relation to other words around it in different fields of 
contemporary discourse, particularly rights and justice. 
The other main, unresolved issue associated with the word law concerns law’s 
provenance, an issue highly germane to understanding what gives law its authority. 
Which surfaces in the relationship between the OED’s first and third branches of 
meaning.11 Branch 1 acknowledges such a complication in a note linked to s9c (the 
first sense in ‘divine’ meanings for law). Concerning the phrase the law of nature, it 
notes, ‘now rarely, because of the frequency of that expression in sense 17’ (i.e. the 
first sense of Branch 3, ‘scientific and philosophical uses’). The OED comments 
on the relevant scientific sense in a note as follows:  
In the physical sciences, law is ‘called more explicitly law of nature or natural law. 
The ‘laws of nature’, by those who first used the term in this sense, were viewed as 
commands imposed by the Deity upon matter, and even writers who do not accept 
this view often speak of them as ‘obeyed’ by the phenomena, or as agents by which 
the phenomena are produced.’  
The physical science meaning of law, that is to say - the one conveying 
‘demonstrated general principle’, and on one reading proclaiming the ambition and 
values of secular science – inherited an earlier, religious schema that was no longer 
completely believed by many users of the expression but which was nevertheless 
retained by them and continues to be discernible as an implication at some 
indefinite level of possibility.  
What is most striking in these aspects of the development of law is that there is no 
neat compartmentalisation between concepts of natural law, positive law, and 
scientific law. Rather, the interrelation between these concepts appears as 
                                         
11 The question of where law comes from and what gives it its authority is of course a major, if not the central, 
question for legal theory, with positions ranging historically and culturally across divine commandment or 
inspiration, customary cultural practice, the command of a sovereign and obligations created by it, ‘recognition’ by 
those subject to the law, and elaboration from a basic, grounding norm – among others. Kelly’s (1992) 
chronologically-narrated account of legal theory, from the Greeks through to the closing stages of the 20th century, 
is particularly accessible and eloquent in its discussion of the relationship between arguments in jurisprudence and 
philosophical and political ideas.  A thought-provoking recent historical and comparative discussion of the 
relationship between law’s provenance and its social function is The Fall of the Priests and the Rise of the Lawyers (2016), 
written by the English international financial lawyer Philip Wood. Concerned with questions of the morality of law, 
past and present, as well as with international finance, Wood traces the changing balance between religions and legal 
systems in different places and periods, arguing for better understanding of the contemporary role of law in creating 




something that can on occasion morph into hybrid or qualified versions which give 
expression to what was (and for many people remains) an unresolved but 
fundamental question about the origin of orderliness in the world and its 
articulation or transformation into human order and law.  
Acknowledging such messiness in ideas conveyed by law - ironically the 
prototypical term for universality of authority and application – conflicts with the 
aim of understanding law as an expression of ‘univocal’ concepts. Despite this, 
close reading of the word in the OED and beyond need not undermine efforts to 
formulate ideal-type concepts or develop arguments based on them. The value of 
the kind of verbal analysis offered here lies rather in the close-up it offers of 
processes of making meaning: a sharpened image of changing and sometimes 
conflicting local uses of words which create and explore what gradually becomes 
more generalized social thought, alongside uses of language which communicate as 
far as possible in already established categories. 
But law, it might be queried, is hardly representative in this respect. Is it not an 
unusual or even unique word? Could it be an exception among the other 
expressions listed above? It might be, but the points being made about law are 
echoed strongly in most of those other words. Even a brief reading of the OED 
entries for those other words shows complexity in number and range of senses, in 
the historical development of different branches of meaning, and as regards 
current polysemy. In most, there is one or more historical turning point, 
divergence, or conflict related to alternative conceptualisations. With some, a crux 
of meaning relates to one or more new fields in which the word begins to be used 
(in ways that result in coexisting technical and general uses); or there may be 
tension between meanings that emerge between concrete and abstract levels, or 
different conceptual fields stimulating new lines of figurative use. Further, because 
polysemy is often accompanied by vagueness (Mehl 2013), as well as sometimes by 
contestability, the words grouped above do all seem complex in the ways I have 
claimed law is. What was argued for law more generally can also be shown for the 
other words: that values, arguments, contradictions and dilemmas are inscribed in a 
word’s multiple, developing senses.12 While much about the meaning of such 
abstract legal terms could only be established by more systematic study, there 
seems an important watershed here in thinking about legal vocabulary: between 
understanding legal ‘key words’ as materials in a historical process of negotiating 
                                         
12 Although written in a different research context, my ‘keyword’ entries for legitimate and rights illustrate these 
features (https://keywordsproject.pitt.edu ). Other relevant entries in the Keywords Project corpus include: authority, 
freedom and liberty, and privilege. 
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ideas and values, and considering words as vehicles for concepts that can be 
detached from the history of their formulation and deployed in contexts where it is 
an overall argument, rather than a density of multiple ideas, interpretations and 
attitudes embedded in particular words, which is expected to be communicated.  
Conclusions 
The account I have offered of this relatively unexplored topic in ‘the language of 
law’ remains highly schematic. My intention has been to show the potential interest 
of the topic and draw attention to possible lines of enquiry. In conclusion, 
however, it is important to comment on two areas of significant theoretical 
difficulty. One concerns a common reservation: that discussing philosophical 
concepts as if they resemble word meanings is misguided. The other concerns a 
claim I made at the beginning of the chapter: that semantic indeterminacy in 
general legal terminology might serve a social purpose in communication between 
the legal sphere and public discourse at large. 
Concepts and Conceptions 
It is not incompatible with the criticisms developed above that it is still easy to 
agree when writers such as Dworkin, Raz or Finnis insist that irrelevant senses of 
words should be filtered out in putting forward a philosophical argument. The 
difficulties that need further consideration occur in a middle-ground, between 
acknowledging the significance of semantic indeterminacy and insisting on 
concepts being ‘univocal’ in the accounts of law they contribute to.  
Difficulties in this area have little to do with general debates in anthropological 
linguistics about how far semantic distinctions reflect cultural distinctions and 
influence cognitive categorization, the traditional ground of ‘linguistic relativism’ 
debates around the Sapir – Whorf hypothesis (Gumperz and Levinson, 1996). The 
issues here are more concerned with the level in a conceptual hierarchy at which 
theoretical analysis of law can most successfully take place. In contrast with the 
critique of fixed the legal concepts I have put forward, for example, a distinction is 
often emphasised between two levels of analysis: the level of unified concepts 
(abstract, ideal notions) and a level of conceptions (particular instantiations, or 
realizations of such concepts). To illustrate that distinction, Dworkin many years 
ago outlined a scenario in which he instructs his children to behave ‘fairly’. In 
doing so, he says he anticipated two possible outcomes: first, that in applying the 
concept of ‘fairness’ his children might go beyond any particular examples of 
conduct he would have thought of himself; and second, that he would be prepared 
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to modify his own view in light of alternative conceptions of fairness which 
underpinned their choices. The significance, for Dworkin, was that his children’s 
actions, and his concession by way of response, do not affect the ‘fairness’ concept 
itself. That concept, he maintains, exists above the varying conceptions of it; and 
the true meaning of his instruction was that his family should be guided by the 
concept of ‘fairness’, while allowing for disagreement over controversial cases 
created by varying conceptions of that concept.  
Dworkin’s scenario serves in part to clarify a distinction he was making between 
two types of legal rule: rules amenable to further development in use but based on 
a large number of overlapping, agreed instances (concept-based rules) and rules 
where detail is specified and which are therefore less amenable to flexibility of 
interpretation (conception-based rules). This distinction appears valuable in 
accounting for the tendency of legislation to follow different conventions in 
different periods and legal systems (especially for modern common-law legislation 
to reach into more areas of life and be more voluminous and detailed than 
previously). As refutation of the contestability of concepts, however, the scenario 
seems inconclusive. How far, for example, does Dworkin’s view depend on the 
contrast he draws between concept and conception, and how far is it coloured by 
an extra dimension - that of family hierarchy - which he introduces in passing, in 
that a ‘law of the father’ dimension complicates prospects for contestability of 
what an overarching concept of fairness should be. Clarification of the example 
also seems needed on how the children’s alternative conceptions related to 
complexities of the particular word fair that Dworkin had used in giving them the 
instruction. 
Varying Dworkin’s scenario slightly in order to draw out such difficulties, by 
creating a hypothetical situation based on justice, may highlight a larger role for 
contextual interpretation in how concepts and conceptions work. Imagine that a 
city mayor exhorts a gathering of her officers to ‘dispense’, ‘do’, or ‘administer’ 
justice (the three commonest verbs, in order of frequency, which immediately 
precede justice in the Oxford English Corpus (OEC), in contrast with obstruct, escape 
and delay as the three most frequent verbs related to different kinds of actor linked 
to justice). In this modified scenario, it is first of all difficult to know whether there 
is one or several different instructions, because what justice means is inflected by 
each particular verb of which it is made the grammatical object. Now imagine that, 
following the instruction, one officer gives public property away, another takes out 
writs, and another inflicts punishment on people. (This is inevitably somewhat 
strained, reflecting simplification already present in the earlier scenario.) Each of 
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the officers’ responses derives from an alternative interpretation of justice, based on 
established senses: ‘quality of being just’ (construed here as some kind of social 
justice objective, justice as a balancing of all interests to be achieved including by 
resource redistribution); ‘administration of law and judicial proceedings’ (justice as 
a matter of proceedings in legal institutions); and ‘punishment or retribution’ 
(rendered more graphic in the now obsolete metonymic sense of the word justice 
reported in OED sense 2b, ‘gallows’). To be credible, each of these responses by 
an officer would need to be enriched considerably. But in outline they suggest that 
an account framed in terms of a dynamic conceptualization or construal of justice, 
narrowed and altered by context, might offer more insight into what justice is than 
an account formulated in terms of conceptions treated as varied embodiments of a 
static, superordinate concept. One reason for preferring a ‘contextualized’ account 
is that it fits better with the word’s recognized semantic indeterminacy. 
Characteristics of such indeterminacy include how justice prompts a similar pattern 
of alternative interpretations through its vagueness (e.g. whether justice can extend 
to extrajudicial detention, deportation, or drone strikes) as well as through its 
contestability (e.g. whether ‘proper’ justice is achieved better by ‘redistribution of 
resources’ or by ‘putting people in prison for longer’). Deciding which of the two 
analyses should be preferred seems to depend further on how the notion of 
‘concept’ is understood (including how static or dynamic concepts are, and what 
internal structure they are assumed to have). It also depends on how far abstract 
cultural concepts should be thought of as being constituted in the course of their 
use in particular verbal and cultural contexts (for further discussion see Croft and 
Cruse 2004; Geeraerts 2010: 240-9; Nuyts and Pederson 1997).13 
Conduit, Competence and Mystification 
The other remaining topic to be addressed concerns the claim I made at the 
beginning of this chapter: that semantic indeterminacy in the general terminology 
of law may function as a conduit for communication between the legal sphere and 
wider public. In introducing that possibility, I presented semantic variation 
between a professional legal group and other social groups descriptively: as a 
matter of overlapping meanings in different domains associated with sub-groups in 
                                         
13 Such a contextualised view of concepts is hardly unknown in law. The jurist Glanville Williams argued over 70 
years ago that context gives meaning to a word by indicating which other word it is opposed to. He gives the 
example of freedom, which he says has no single meaning: ‘Freedom versus imprisonment; freedom versus legal duty; 
freedom versus deprivation of the franchise; freedom versus imposition; freedom versus economic bondage; 
freedom versus determinism; freedom versus licence – all these are different meanings.’ (Williams, 1945:301). 
Alongside freedom, Williams notes a similar characteristic in other ‘chameleon words’, as he calls them, including 




a larger, overall language community. No relations of power, standards of 
correctness, or order of priority within the social hierarchy were countenanced. A 
contrasting view of such semantic variation would however be that it shows in the 
given society an endemic and potentially dangerous failure of comprehension and 
associated ignorance of the law. A polemical account might go on to insist on 
greater respect for professional legal discourse as a society’s guarantor of correct 
meaning (e.g. as opposed to use or abuse of words with inconsistent meanings or 
implications in various political and other kinds of rhetoric). 
Surprisingly little theoretical attention has been given to such questions in 
linguistics, as far as I know. One way of beginning to explore them, however, is 
through philosophical arguments regarding a social ‘division of linguistic labour’ 
put forward in Putnam’s article ‘The Meaning of Meaning’ (1975), taken up by 
other writers including Bartsch (1987) (for discussion of connections with the 
socioculturally situated nature of meaning more generally, see Geeraerts 2010: 244-
58). Putnam’s main arguments were not about normative meaning, and certainly 
not about law, but rather a critique of the psychological account of meaning (i.e. 
the view that meanings exist in the mind rather than in features of the things words 
refer to). His exposition of differences between specialised and general 
understandings of words comes halfway through a far more wide-ranging 
philosophical argument (Putnam 1975: 223-9).  
Starting from the observation that the author himself cannot distinguish an elm 
from a beech tree, seeing both merely as deciduous trees, Putnam argues that for 
many words (in a modern society very many, and not only technical words - but his 
arguments are restricted to so-called natural-kind words) it is only experts in a 
given area who fully comprehend the essential properties of referents, which for 
Putnam provide the proper basis of meaning. Further, he suggests, whatever we 
take as full understanding is subject to change (e.g. as the result of scientific 
advances). Many language users (here I extend possible instances speculatively 
from Putnam’s concrete, natural-kind words such as elm, gold, or tiger to abstract 
terms such as hedge-fund, efficiency, well-being, or rights) will only understand what they 
mean partially, in his ‘externalist’ sense. Our understanding, Putnam suggests, often 
takes the form instead of reduced stereotypes (typically, a prototypical concept plus 
semantic extensions depending on how much any particular language user is 
motivated to know, given their social situation). On this basis Putnam postulates, 
at least for natural-kind terms, ‘a division of linguistic labour’ which he outlines 
through an analogy between a social community and a factory (Putnam 1975:227). 
Variably according to the different social groups they belong to, language users 
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according to Putnam engage in a kind of ‘semantic deference’ to whichever class of 
speakers in the population is taken to possess the relevant expertise to stipulate 
correct referents for the words a particular language user needs to use. The result 
(subject to variation between societies as regards the degree of prestige and trust 
they are willing to accord to experts) is some kind of tacit ‘correct terminology’ 
authority that consists of experts who may, in different circumstances, be 
scientists, chefs, boat-builders, gardeners, or others. Putnam argues that, in our use 
of imperfectly understood vocabulary items, we attune or orientate towards the 
usage of such experts (but in doing so nevertheless need to understand words at 
some threshold level ourselves, if we are to be competent language users). At the 
level of a whole society, language in Putnam’s view functions accordingly like a 
massive, hierarchically ordered machine that works collectively, with cooperation 
but also subordination governing the different extents of understanding of what 
things around us are or mean – a fundamentally different view from the flat 
structure of signifying contrasts associated with traditional descriptive linguistics. 
Philosophical speculations of the kind Putnam puts forward may seem a long way 
from practical issues of people attributing different meanings to general legal terms 
in different walks of life. But one notable attraction of Putnam’s approach is that – 
exceptionally for academic linguistic thinking - it directly addresses linguistic 
normativity not only as a matter of constraints imposed on what people say but 
also in what words mean. The semantic normativity made visible in his approach is 
concerned with whether meanings meet some standard of correctness and, if so, 
what confers the relevant standard or combination of standards, given that full 
understanding of all aspects of a modern society is something impossible for any 
individual language user to achieve.  
What implications follow from such arguments is not straightforward. Clearly there 
can be no direct transposition of Putnam’s arguments onto discussion of abstract 
rather than concrete words; some points which may be convincing in relation to 
natural-kind terms will not apply to abstract legal terms because of the very 
different notion of ‘reference’ they call for. Another reason Putnam’s ideas in this 
area have not been widely discussed is that the social ramifications of his 
conception of linguistic norms - that some level of competence is needed to be a 
functioning member of a language community but that deferring to the semantic 
expertise of others in particular domains is normal - is widely considered 
rebarbative and ‘authoritarian’ (for discussion, see Geeraerts 2010:255-6). As 
regards legal terminology that provides essential terms in the general vocabulary of 
wider political and moral debate, even in a democracy, presumption of correctness 
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on this view might be thought to rest with lawyers’ expert knowledge rather than 
being spread across the more heterogeneous population. Non-lawyers’ 
understandings of such key words would be assumed, in Putnam’s terms, to rest 
merely on stereotypes, and should yield to the semantic jurisdiction of legal experts 
(presumably either by paying for advice or being confined to listening rather than 
speaking).  
In contrast to this hierarchical way of ordering language in a pluralistic society, 
Bartsch (1987) encourages an alternative conception of linguistic norms. While 
acknowledging the possibility of serious norm-conflicts, especially firefights around 
disputed interpretations at occasional social flashpoints, Bartsch argues that more 
constructive forms of political engagement are possible, especially where situations 
can only resolve or move forward through social cooperation. That basic fact 
about situations, she suggests, encourages people to be more pragmatic and 
tolerant of semantic flexibility, including vagueness, simplification of complex 
material, and slippages of meaning. Semantic indeterminacy, she argues, may in 
some circumstances even facilitate satisfaction of a higher-order communicative 
norm, whether of promoting efficiency in the exchange of information or in 
managing social interaction (Bartsch 1987: 209-18). 
In the present state of understanding, discussion of what follows practically from 
key words about law circulating in general vocabulary can move very quickly from 
what is known into fantasy politics, such as the notion that Bartsch’s position 
might somehow make it possible to ‘take back the law’ into democratic control. 
But if we keep closer to Putnam’s and Bartsch’s actual positions, the implications 
are more limited. One view broadly aligned with Putnam’s account, as has been 
suggested above, points towards semantic jurisdiction over key terms of law being 
maintained by a specialist professional elite. Their power over meaning would not 
be limited to being exercised in law itself, where (despite initiatives including 
alternative dispute resolution and cases argued by self-representing litigants) it 
would be difficult for a legal system to function otherwise; it would also diffuse 
through wider channels of normative influence into other social domains, 
including politics. Given the scale of reservations expressed in some studies of 
legal language (e.g. Mellinkoff’s (1963) and Tiersma’s (1999) accounts of the 
development of the legal profession as the establishment of a mediaeval oligarchy 
exploiting specialist linguistic knowledge for the purpose of rent-seeking), such a 
view would be questionable, or even unpalatable, to many. But while Bartsch’s 
alternative vision of linguistic norms offers a vision of a more participative and 
negotiated society, it is in obvious tension with law’s obligation ultimately to assert 
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some kind of definitive social order after balancing the benefits of such order 
against personal and group freedoms.  
As yet, there is little to go on in forming a better general view of how legal-lay 
communication can function, beyond acknowledging simultaneous separation and 
yet porosity between legally decided meanings and the circulation of general ‘law’ 
words. It is clearly desirable, in our 21st century political culture, to understand 
tensions in the use of abstract vocabulary with greater clarity and calculation of 
social effect than how such terms were viewed in the early days of democracy in 
the United States by Alexis de Tocqueville (2003 [1838]). Aristocracies, Tocqueville 
argued in his essay ‘How American democracy has modified the language’, had 
been static, and their use of language reflected political inertia. Democracies, in 
contrast, encourage constant agitation of ideas as well as competition between 
them as old thoughts disappear, reappear, or are ‘split into minute shades of 
meaning’ (2003:554). For Tocqueville, the political implications of the political and 
linguistic shift from aristocracy to democracy, and the taste for change which 
accompanied it, were mixed. Writers, he argued – taking as an example his own use 
of the word equality - rarely dwell on a single thought but instead ‘point their aim at 
a knot of ideas, leaving the reader to judge which of them has been hit’ (2003:555). 
A ‘secret fascination’ for imprecise ideas, he believed, displayed itself most clearly 
in ‘constant use of generic and abstract terms and a peculiar way of using them’ 
(2003:557-8). Tocqueville’s enthusiasm for a republic of ideas built on such terms 
was tempered, accordingly, by caution on account of their uncertain meaning: ‘One 
abstract word’, he warned, ‘is like a box with a false bottom: you put into it the 
ideas you want and take them out again unobserved’ (2003:558). Such a risk, it 
seems, continues to exacerbate the already complicated interplay between general 
words used in controlled circumstances in law and their potentially more expansive 
use in political discourse and ‘ordinary language’. 
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